More Thoughts on HPS: Another 20 Years Later
More Thoughts on HPS: Another 20 Years Later
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关于 HPS 的更多思考：又一个 20 年后
DOI：
10.1162/posc_a_00049
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发表时间：
2011
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
J. Schickore
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
J. Schickore
本文论述了历史学与科学哲学关系之争的历史沿革，以及HPS作为一种学术奋进的价值和前景。我开始先简要概述一下1960年代末和1970年代的辩论。当时，一些科学哲学家认为，哲学分析是解释性的，理解一个概念或实践涉及理解它是如何产生的。然而，最近，科学的哲学研究被比作科学理论建设。最近的辩论中渗透着一个基本思想，即追求HPS意味着用历史数据来对抗一般哲学框架。我认为，这种“对抗模式”的HPS是非常有问题的，应该放弃。相反，我们应该（再次）认识到，对科学的哲学反思是解释性的，历史主义对科学、方法论和认识论概念的分析增强了我们对科学的理解。
This essay deals with the recent history of the disputes about the relation between history and philosophy of science and the merits and prospects of HPS as an intellectual endeavor. I begin with a brief outline of the debates in the late 1960s and 1970s. At that time, several philosophers of science argued that philosophical analysis was interpretive and that understanding a concept or practice involved understanding how it came about. More recently, however, philosophical studies of science have been likened to scientific theory construction. One basic idea permeates recent debates, namely, that pursuing HPS means confronting general philosophical frameworks with historical data. I argue that this “confrontation model” of HPS is highly problematic and should be abandoned. Instead, we should appreciate (again) that philosophical reflection on science is interpretive, and that historicist analyses of scientific, methodological, and epistemological concepts augment our understanding of science.