Detecting Nuclear Materials Smuggling: Performance Evaluation of Container Inspection Policies
Detecting Nuclear Materials Smuggling: Performance Evaluation of Container Inspection Policies
复制标题
检测核材料走私：集装箱检查政策的绩效评估
作者：
Gary M. Gaukler;Chenhua Li;Yu Ding;S. Chirayath
近年来，美国与许多国家一起大幅加强针对恐怖袭击的侦查和防御机制。使用走私到该国的核材料进行的潜在核武器攻击已被确定为特别严重的威胁。美国入境口岸目前安装的非法核材料检测系统在很大程度上依赖于无源辐射探测器和使用自动瞄准系统（ATS）的风险评分方法。在本文中，我们分析了现有的检查系统，并展示了其在几种走私场景中的性能。我们提供的证据表明，当前的检查系统本质上无法可靠地检测使用少量屏蔽良好的核材料的复杂走私企图。为了克服当前基于 ATS 的检测系统的弱点，我们提出了两种新的检测系统：硬度控制系统 (HCS) 和混合检测系统 (HYB)。 HCS 使用射线照相信息根据货物内容将传入集装箱分为“硬”或“软”集装箱，然后进行不同的检查处理。 HYB 将射线照相信息与来自 ATS 的情报信息相结合。我们将这两种新检测系统与现有基于 ATS 的系统的相对性能进行比较和对比。我们的研究表明，对于各种现实的走私场景，HCS 和 HYB 政策优于基于 ATS 的政策。我们还研究了对手行为变化对新检查系统的影响，发现它们有效地阻止了对手的战略博弈行为。
In recent years, the United States, along with many other countries, has significantly increased its detection and defense mechanisms against terrorist attacks. A potential attack with a nuclear weapon, using nuclear materials smuggled into the country, has been identified as a particularly grave threat. The system for detecting illicit nuclear materials that is currently in place at U.S. ports of entry relies heavily on passive radiation detectors and a risk‐scoring approach using the Automated Targeting System (ATS). In this article we analyze this existing inspection system and demonstrate its performance for several smuggling scenarios. We provide evidence that the current inspection system is inherently incapable of reliably detecting sophisticated smuggling attempts that use small quantities of well‐shielded nuclear material. To counter the weaknesses of the current ATS‐based inspection system, we propose two new inspection systems: the Hardness Control System (HCS) and the Hybrid Inspection system (HYB). The HCS uses radiography information to classify incoming containers based on their cargo content into “hard” or “soft” containers, which then go through different inspection treatment. The HYB combines the radiography information with the intelligence information from the ATS. We compare and contrast the relative performance of these two new inspection systems with the existing ATS‐based system. Our studies indicate that the HCS and HYB policies outperform the ATS‐based policy for a wide range of realistic smuggling scenarios. We also examine the impact of changes in adversary behavior on the new inspection systems and find that they effectively preclude strategic gaming behavior of the adversary.