Nationhood and the national question in the Soviet Union and post-Soviet Eurasia: An institutionalist account
Nationhood and the national question in the Soviet Union and post-Soviet Eurasia: An institutionalist account
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苏联和后苏联欧亚大陆的民族性和民族问题：制度主义的解释
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发表时间：
1994
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影响因子：
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通讯作者：
Rogers Brubaker
中科院分区：
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作者：
Rogers Brubaker
苏联民族政权以其独特而普遍的方式将国家和民族制度化，向后继国家传递了一套结构深刻且强烈冲突的归属感期望。继承国家的精英们有着深刻的制度化的政治所有权和权利意识，他们把以自己国家的名字命名的政治——首先是领土和机构，但也带着一些矛盾的心理，把人口也看作是“他们自己的”，从根本上说，是属于他们的。少数民族，尤其是俄罗斯人，在制度上得到支持，对国家的理解基本上是民族文化的，他们认为自己即使不是排他性的，也深深地属于一个“外部”国家；即使不排除，这也只能使他们对他们所生活的、他们（或他们中的大多数）拥有公民身份的未来民族国家的归属有所影响和限定。最后，俄罗斯的国家精英们，他们的民族自我理解在苏联时期并没有嵌入到俄罗斯联邦的制度和领土框架中，现在只是非常不完美地包含在俄罗斯联邦的制度和领土框架中，他们将非俄罗斯继承国中的俄罗斯少数民族，以一种不明确但有力的意义，视为新兴俄罗斯国家的一部分。这些根深蒂固的、强烈冲突的归属期望——当然，与国家建设、政权更迭和经济重组所产生的利益冲突相互作用——将使非俄罗斯继承国、俄罗斯少数民族和俄罗斯国家之间的动态相互作用成为未来几年难以解决的、潜在的爆炸性民族冲突的焦点。
ConclusionThe Soviet nationality regime, with its distinctive and pervasive manner of institutionalizing nationhood and nationality, has transmitted to the successor states a set of deeply structured, and powerfully conflicting,expectations of belonging. Successor state elites, with their deeply institutionalized sense of political ownership and entitlement, see the polities that bear the names of their nation — above all the territory and institutions, but also, with some ambivalence, the population as well — as “their own,” as belonging, in a fundamental sense, to them. National minorities, above all Russians, with their institutionally supported, basically ethnocultural understanding of nationhood, see themselves as belonging, in a deep if not exclusive sense, to an “external” nation; this cannot help but color and qualify, even if it does not exclude, their belonging to the would-be nation-state in which they live, and of which they (or most of them) hold citizenship. Russian state elites, finally, whose national self-understanding was not in the Soviet period embedded in, and is now only very imperfectly contained by, the institutional and territorial frame of the Russian Federation, see the Russian minorities in the non-Russian successor states as belonging, in an ill-defined yet potent sense, to the emerging Russian state. These deeply rooted and powerfully conflicting expectations of belonging — interacting, of course, with conflicts of interest engendered by state-building, regime change, and economic restructuring — will make the dynamic interplay between non-Russian successor states, Russian minorities, and the Russian state a locus of refractory, and potentially explosive, ethnonational conflict in coming years.