A critical look at the embodied cognition hypothesis and a new proposal for grounding conceptual content
A critical look at the embodied cognition hypothesis and a new proposal for grounding conceptual content
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DOI：
10.1016/j.jphysparis.2008.03.004
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发表时间：
2008-01-01
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
Caramazza, Alfonso
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Mahon, Bradford Z.;Caramazza, Alfonso
许多研究表明，感觉和运动系统在概念加工过程中被激活。这些结果被解释为表明概念和更广泛的认知的重要方面是具体化的。这一结论并非来自经验证据。原因是经验证据同样可以被概念表征的“无实体”观点所容纳，该观点对概念系统、感觉系统和运动系统之间的激活传播做出了明确的假设。与此同时，具身认知假说的强有力形式与目前可用的神经心理学证据不一致。我们建议在具身认知假说和无身认知假说之间找到一个中间立场--以互动为基础。这一假说结合了概念在某种程度上是“抽象的”和“象征性的”的观点，以及感觉和运动信息可能“实例化”在线概念处理的观点。(C)2008爱思唯尔有限公司保留所有权利。
Many studies have demonstrated that the sensory and motor systems are activated during conceptual processing. Such results have been interpreted as indicating that concepts, and important aspects of cognition more broadly, are embodied. That conclusion does not follow from the empirical evidence. The reason why is that the empirical evidence can equally be accommodated by a 'disembodied' view of conceptual representation that makes explicit assumptions about spreading activation between the conceptual and sensory and motor systems. At the same time, the strong form of the embodied cognition hypothesis is at variance with currently available neuropsychological evidence. We suggest a middle ground between the embodied and disembodied cognition hypotheses - grounding by interaction. This hypothesis combines the view that concepts are, at some level, 'abstract' and 'symbolic', with the idea that sensory and motor information may 'instantiate' online conceptual processing. (C) 2008 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.