Malapportionment, Gerrymandering, and Party Fortunes in Congressional Elections
Malapportionment, Gerrymandering, and Party Fortunes in Congressional Elections
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国会选举中的分配不当、不公正选区和政党命运
DOI：
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发表时间：
1972
影响因子：
6.8
通讯作者：
Robert S. Erikson
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Robert S. Erikson
本文探讨了美国众议院选举中北方选票的党派划分与北方众议院席位的党派划分之间的关系。至少从1952年到1964年，在北方选区划分方面，有一种明显的亲共和党倾向，即共和党人赢得的席位始终比民主党人从相同比例的选票中获得的席位多10%。1964年大选后，这种党派不平等现象消失了，但有证据表明，这种变化只是暂时的。共和党在北方众议院选举中占据优势的正常模式是由共和党的一种偶然起源造成的：民主党选民倾向于聚集在民主党占多数的地区，在那里他们对国会的选票被“浪费”了。无论是分配不公还是故意的党派划分，似乎都没有在扭曲众议院选举结果方面发挥重要作用。
This paper explores the relationship between the partisan division of the northern vote in U.S. House elections and the partisan division of northern House seats. From at least 1952 through 1964, there was a noticeable pro-Republican bias to northern districting, in the sense that the Republicans consistently won about ten per cent more of the seats than the Democrats could obtain from the same percentage of the vote. Following the 1964 election, this partisan inequity has disappeared, but the evidence suggests that this change is only temporary. The normal pattern of a Republican advantage in northern House elections is produced by a Republican gerrymander of accidental origins: the tendency of Democratic voters to cluster in heavily Democratic areas where their votes for Congress go “wasted.” Neither malapportionment nor deliberate partisan gerrymandering appears to have played a major role in distorting the outcomes of House elections.