Government Decision-Making and the Incidence of Federal Mandates
Government Decision-Making and the Incidence of Federal Mandates
复制标题
政府决策和联邦授权的发生
DOI：
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发表时间：
2000
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
Katherine Baicker
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Katherine Baicker
本文分析了联邦政府授权的项目变化对州政府支出和收入的影响，结合并评估了州政府决策过程中几种常见理论的预测价值。使用公共医疗支出的几个外源性增加的来源，我估计，整个国家的部分负担的强制性支出是由其他公共福利支出的减少。虽然联邦授权可能会影响州一级福利的构成，但要改变州转移支付的总水平要困难得多。国家对不同冲击的反应的比较表明，这些减少部分是由于选民效用函数中的项目的可替代性，但也部分是由于预算类别内支出的“粘性”。接受者和选民之间种族差异较大的州和邻居不那么慷慨的州减少了更多的其他公共福利支出，减轻了医疗扩张给纳税人带来的负担。因此，授权可能只会增加各国之间的不平等。
This paper analyzes the effects of federally-mandated program changes on state spending and revenues, incorporating and evaluating the predictive value of several common theories of the state decision-making process. Using several sources of exogenous increases in public medical spending, I estimate that the entire state portion of the burden of mandated spending is borne by decreases in other public welfare spending. While federal mandates may influence the composition of benefits at the state level, it is much more difficult for them to change the total level of state transfers. Comparison of state reactions to different shocks suggests that these reductions are due in part to the substitutability of programs in the voter utility function but also in part to the "stickiness" of spending within budget categories. States with greater racial differences between recipients and voters and states with less generous neighbors reduce other public welfare spending by even more, alleviating the burden the medical expansions imposed on their taxpayers. Mandates may thus serve only in to increase inequality across states.