Price competition with repeat, loyal buyers
Price competition with repeat, loyal buyers
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与回头客、忠实买家的价格竞争
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发表时间：
2007
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通讯作者：
Nanda S. Kumar
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作者：
Eric T. Anderson;Nanda S. Kumar
现有的理论模型表明，消费者忠诚度越高，企业的市场力量越大，价格越高，价格促销越少(Klemperer，《经济学季刊》102(2):375-394,1987a，《经济研究》97(0):99-177,1987b，《经济研究评论》62(4):515 - 539,1995；《经济理论研究》(2):1 - 3,1995。然而，在一些市场，能够比竞争对手产生更多消费者忠诚度的大型全国性品牌会提供更低的价格和更频繁的促销。在本文中，我们建立了一个两期博弈论的、不对称的双寡头垄断模型，在这个模型中，企业保留重复忠诚买家的能力是不同的。在这个市场中，我们证明了对于产生更多忠诚度的公司来说，提供较低的平均价格和比较弱的竞争对手更频繁的促销是最优的。对这种非对称模型的更一般的无限周期版本的数值分析得出了三个额外的结果。首先，我们证明了弱企业吸引重复忠诚消费者的能力与强企业利润之间存在倒u型关系。其次，我们证明了企业吸引重复购买者的相对能力会影响序列和同期价格相关性是正的还是负的。最后，我们强调了动态对企业预期价格和利润的影响。
Extant theoretical models suggest that greater consumer loyalty increases a firm’s market power and leads to higher prices and fewer price promotions (Klemperer, Quarterly Journal of Economics 102(2):375–394, 1987a, Economic Journal 97(0):99–177, 1987b, Review of Economic Studies 62(4):515–539, 1995; Padilla, Journal of Economic Theory 67(2):520–530, 1995). However, in some markets large, national brands that are able to generate more consumer loyalty than their rivals offer lower prices and promote more frequently. In this paper, we develop a two-period game-theoretic, asymmetric duopoly model in which firms differ in their ability to retain repeat, loyal buyers. In this market, we demonstrate that it is optimal for a firm that generates more loyalty to offer a lower average price and promote more frequently than a weaker competitor. Numerical analysis of a more general infinite period version of this asymmetric model leads to three additional results. First, we show that there is an inverted-U relationship between a weak firm’s ability to attract repeat, loyal consumers and strong firm profits. Second, we show that the relative ability of firms to attract repeat buyers affects whether serial and contemporaneous price correlations are positive or negative. Finally, we highlight the effect of dynamics on firms’ expected prices and profits.