Coordination, learning, and delay
Coordination, learning, and delay
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协调、学习和延迟
DOI：
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发表时间：
2002
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
A. Dasgupta
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
A. Dasgupta
本文研究了引入延迟成本的社会学习对不完全信息协调博弈的影响。我们提出了一个易于处理的嘈杂的动态协调游戏与社会学习和成本延迟。我们证明了这个博弈有一个唯一的单调均衡。动态博弈的均衡与类似的静态协调博弈的均衡的比较明确了社会学习的作用。分析了动态博弈中的内生和外生行动顺序。在噪声消失的极限下，社会福利在这些博弈中严格排名，在具有内生排序的动态博弈中实现了最高的福利。我们证明，外源性的不稳定性是不能替代内源性的不稳定性。我们还表明，根据内生秩序，噪声消失，协调的效率最大化在中间成本延迟。这些结果的鲁棒性数值说明远离完整的信息限制，当封闭的形式不可用。我们的研究结果对债务的首次公开发行，以及在不完全信息下采用新技术具有一定的意义。
This paper studies how the introduction of social learning with costs to delay affects coordination games with incomplete information. We present a tractable noisy dynamic coordination game with social learning and costs to delay. We show that this game has a unique monotone equilibrium. A comparison of the equilibrium of the dynamic game with the equilibria of analogous static coordination games explicates the role of social learning. The analysis is carried out for both endogenous and exogenous order of moves in the dynamic game. In the limit as noise vanishes, social welfare is strictly ranked in these games, with the highest welfare achieved in the dynamic game with endogenous ordering. We demonstrate that exogenous asynchronicity is not a substitute for endogenous asynchronicity. We also show that under endogenous ordering, as noise vanishes, the efficiency of coordination is maximized at intermediate costs to delay. The robustness of these results is illustrated numerically away from the complete information limit, when closed forms are not available. Our results have implications for the initial public offerings of debt, as well as for the adoption of new technology under incomplete information.