Credible conceptions and implausible probabilities.
Credible conceptions and implausible probabilities.
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可信的概念和难以置信的概率。
DOI：
10.1111/j.2044-8317.1986.tb00842.x
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发表时间：
1986
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
R. R. Macdonald
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
R. R. Macdonald
Tversky和Kahneman关于人们无法处理概率的演示得到了详细的检验。概率概念中固有的模糊性和对话逻辑的规则被用来证明受试者的明显谬误。此外，即使在数学概率的框架下，特弗斯基和卡尼曼的一些受试者的行为也得到了辩护。数学概率与日常决策的相关性被认为是值得商榷的。明智地将一个问题概念化，被认为比拥有与量化概率模型明显一致的信念更重要。概念化应考虑到使用概率的意义、应如何对不同的可能性进行分类以及所提供信息的可靠性。
Tversky and Kahneman's demonstrations of people's inability to handle probabilities are examined in detail. The inherent ambiguity in the concept of probability and the rules of conversational logic are used to justify subjects' apparent fallacies. Moreover even in the framework of mathematical probability some of Tversky and Kahneman's subjects' behaviour is defended. The relevance of mathematical probability to everyday decisions is seen as being open to question. Conceptualizing a problem sensibly is held to be more important than having beliefs which are demonstrably consistent with a quantitative probabilistic model. The conceptualization should have regard to the sense in which probability is being used, how different possibilities should be categorized and the reliability of the presented information.