Voting on the Budget Deficit
Voting on the Budget Deficit
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对预算赤字进行投票
DOI：
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发表时间：
1988
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
A. Alesina
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
G. Tabellini;A. Alesina
本文分析了一个模型，其中不同理性个体对公共支出的构成和时间概况进行投票。当前和未来多数人之间的潜在分歧会导致聚合个人偏好的社会选择函数不稳定。在均衡状态下，大多数选民可能会支持预算赤字。当前多数派与未来潜在多数派之间的两极分化越大，多数统治下的赤字规模往往就越大。论文还表明，该模型的事前有效均衡涉及平衡预算。然而，平衡预算修正案在多数决定下并不持久。
This paper analyzes a model in which different rational individuals vote over the composition and time profile of public spending. Potential disagreement between current and future majorities generates instability in the social choice function that aggregates individual preferences. In equilibrium a majority of the voters may favor a budget deficit. The size of the deficit under majority rule tends to be larger the greater is the polarization between current and potential future majorities. The paper also shows that the ex-ante efficient equilibrium of this model involves a balanced budget. A balanced budget amendment, however, is not durable under majority rule.