From Population Games to Payoff Dynamics Models: A Passivity-Based Approac
From Population Games to Payoff Dynamics Models: A Passivity-Based Approac
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从群体博弈到支付动态模型：基于被动性的方法
DOI：
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发表时间：
2019
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
J. Shamma
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Shinkyu Park;N. C. Martins;J. Shamma
这篇教程文章描述了一个动力系统框架植根于进化博弈原理，以表征大量有限理性代理之间的非合作战略互动。它还概述了最近的结果，使用被动概念来表征纳什均衡的稳定性。在我们的框架中，每个代理属于一个人口，规定其成员的战略集和战略修订协议。一个所谓的社会状态注册的代理人在每个人口中采用每种策略的比例和预先选择的动态回报机制，指定的回报动力学模型（PDM），确定作为社会状态的因果图的回报。根据该框架，每个代理必须采取一种策略，它可以根据其当前策略以及有关其可用的收益和社会状态的信息随着时间的推移反复修改。在我们的框架中考虑的PDM类可以精确或近似地建模普遍的动态行为，如学习和网络效应所固有的惯性和延迟，这是不能用传统的无记忆支付机制（通常被称为人口游戏）捕获的。我们将文章分为两个主要部分。第一个介绍了现有的方法，其中的人口游戏决定的回报，而第二个认为，而一般的PDM类，其中每一个人口游戏是一个特殊的情况下流行的基本概念。后者阐述了一个被动为基础的方法来表征收敛的社会状态纳什均衡。
This tutorial article describes a dynamical systems framework rooted in evolutionary game principles to characterize non-cooperative strategic interactions among large populations of bounded rationality agents. It also overviews recent results that use passivity notions to characterize the stability of Nash-like equilibria. In our framework, each agent belongs to a population that prescribes to its members a strategy set and a strategy revision protocol. A so-called social state registers the proportions of agents in every population adopting each strategy and a pre-selected dynamic payoff mechanism, specified by a payoff dynamics model (PDM), determines the payoff as a causal map of the social state. According to the framework, each agent must take up a strategy at a time, which it can repeatedly revise over time based on its current strategy, and information about the payoff and social state available to it. The PDM class considered in our framework can model precisely or approximately prevalent dynamic behaviors such as inertia and delays that are inherent to learning and network effects, which cannot be captured using conventional memoryless payoff mechanisms (often referred to as population games).We organize the article in two main parts. The first introduces basic concepts prevailing in existing approaches in which a population game determines the payoff, while the second considers rather general PDM classes, of which every population game is a particular case. The latter expounds a passivity-based methodology to characterize convergence of the social state to Nash-like equilibria.