Trade credit insurance: insuring strategy of the retailer and the manufacturer
Trade credit insurance: insuring strategy of the retailer and the manufacturer
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DOI：
10.1080/00207543.2020.1861358
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发表时间：
2020-12
影响因子：
9.2
通讯作者：
Hongping Li;Gongbing Bi;Wen Song;Xiaoyong Yuan
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Hongping Li;Gongbing Bi;Wen Song;Xiaoyong Yuan
摘要本文研究了在一个零售商、一个制造商和一个保险商的资本受限供应链中，贸易信用保险的作用以及零售商和制造商的保险策略。我们将这三个参与者之间的互动建模为两级Stackelberg博弈，并探讨他们的运营和财务决策。研究发现，当制造商的损失厌恶程度较高或零售商的初始资本较低时，会选择贸易信用保险。贸易信用保险的采用提高了零售商的订货量，提高了供应链各参与方的绩效，提高了供应链效率。但是，这也增加了零售商的破产风险和整个供应链的不稳定性。此外，由制造商单独申请贸易信用保险对制造商，保险公司和整个供应链都更有利，因为它为他们创造了更好的业绩。相反，零售商购买贸易信用保险对零售商来说更可取，因为它不仅产生更高的利润，而且破产风险更低。
ABSTRACT This study analyses the role of trade credit insurance and the insuring strategy of the retailer and the manufacturer in a capital-constrained supply chain with one retailer, one manufacturer, and one insurer. We model the interaction among these three participants as a two-level Stackelberg game and explore their operational and financial decisions. We find that trade credit insurance is adopted when the manufacturer's loss aversion is high or the retailer's initial capital is low. The adoption of trade credit insurance improves the order quantity of the retailer, the performance of each supply chain participant, and supply chain efficiency. However, it also increases the bankruptcy risk of the retailer and the instability of the entire supply chain. In addition, the application of trade credit insurance by the manufacturer alone is more beneficial to the manufacturer, insurer, and entire supply chain as it creates better performance for them. Conversely, the purchase of trade credit insurance by the retailer is more desirable to the retailer as it yields not only a higher profit but also a lower bankruptcy risk.