Time preference, international migration, and social security
Time preference, international migration, and social security
复制标题
时间偏好、国际移民和社会保障
DOI：
--
复制
发表时间：
2000
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
V. Meier
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
V. Meier
抽象的。本文在两国代际重叠的框架中分析了长期移民激励的形成以及从“自给自足”到“自由移民”的政权更迭的后果。在自给自足的情况下，各国的总储蓄率或养老金工资比率可能有所不同。结果表明，一个人更喜欢生活在资本与劳动力比率接近黄金法则水平且其特征相对稀缺的国家。移民的激励和自由移民的后果都是由这两种效应决定的。
Abstract. This paper analyzes both the formation of long-run migration incentives and the consequences of a regime change from “autarky” to “free migration” in an overlapping-generations framework with two countries. Under autarky the countries may differ with respect to their aggregate savings rate or with respect to their pension-wage ratio. It is shown that an individual prefers to live in a country where the capital-labor ratio is close to the Golden Rule level and where his characteristics are relatively scarce. Both the migration incentives and the consequences of free migration are determined by these two effects.