Reevaluating Alliance Reliability
Reevaluating Alliance Reliability
复制标题
重新评估联盟的可靠性
DOI：
10.1177/0022002700044005006
复制
发表时间：
2000
影响因子：
3.1
通讯作者：
S. Mitchell
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
B. Leeds;A. Long;S. Mitchell
以前报告的经验证据表明，当冲突发生时，军事联盟是不可靠的；国家领导人应该只期望他们的盟友在25%的时间里加入他们的战争。然而，解释领导人选择形成合作协议的理论论点与这些经验证据不一致。理论与证据之间的这种令人困惑的差距促使人们重新考虑以前衡量联盟可靠性的方法。许多联盟条约都包含关于联盟生效的具体情况的具体语言，通常将义务限制在与特定目标国家或特定地理区域的争端中，而且许多条约并不要求国家参加积极的战斗。考虑到联盟协议中包含的具体义务，可以更好地估计各国履行其承诺的倾向。结果表明，联盟在74.5%的情况下是可靠的。
Previously reported empirical evidence suggests that when conflict arises, military alliances are not reliable; state leaders should only expect their alliance partners to join them in war about 25% of the time. Yet, theoretical arguments explaining the choices of leaders to form cooperative agreements are at odds with such empirical evidence. This puzzling gap between theory and evidence motivates a reconsideration of previous measures of alliance reliability. Many alliance treaties include specific language regarding the circumstances under which the alliance comes into effect, often limiting obligations to disputes with specific target states or in specific geographic areas, and many treaties do not go so far as to require states to join in active fighting. Considering the specific obligations included in alliance agreements provides an improved estimate of the propensity of states to honor their commitments. Results show that alliances are reliable 74.5% of the time.