Perverse environmental effects of ambient charges in a Bertrand duopoly
Perverse environmental effects of ambient charges in a Bertrand duopoly
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伯特兰双寡头垄断中环境电荷对环境的不利影响
DOI：
10.1080/21606544.2012.714972
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发表时间：
2012
影响因子：
2.6
通讯作者：
S. Raju
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Subhadra Ganguli;S. Raju
本文研究了在Bertrand类型的双寡头市场中，环境收费增加对总污染的影响。我们分析了两个不同的模型。在第一种模式中，监管机构宣布环境收费，然后两家公司同时设定价格。在第二个模型中，在监管者宣布环境收费后，两家公司同时选择第一阶段的污染治理技术和第二阶段的价格。这篇论文的一个有趣的结论是，在这两个模型中，企业之间的战略互动可能会导致对总污染的“反常”环境收费效应。也就是说，环境电荷的增加可能会导致更大的污染。
This paper investigates the effect of an increase in ambient charges on total pollution in a Bertrand-type duopolistic market. We analyse two distinct models. In the first model, the regulator announces the ambient charge and then both firms set their prices simultaneously. In the second model, after the regulator announces the ambient charge, both firms simultaneously choose their pollution abatement technologies in the first stage and prices in the second stage. An interesting conclusion of this paper is that in both models the strategic interaction between the firms can lead to a “perverse” ambient charge effect on total pollution. That is, an increase in the ambient charge may lead to greater pollution.