Cartel Unity over the Business Cycle
Cartel Unity over the Business Cycle
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商业周期中的卡特尔团结
DOI：
10.2307/136237
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发表时间：
1997
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
Mukesh Eswaran
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Mukesh Eswaran
本文研究了经济周期中企业容易破产时的卡特尔行为。这种脆弱性将限制在重复博弈中可行的共谋均衡的集合，并可能导致所有共谋协议在衰退中崩溃。然而，事实证明，在卡特尔中存在一个低成本生产商可以防止这种崩溃。通过调整整个商业周期的市场份额（从而消除其效率低下的竞争对手破产的可能性），这个（“摇摆”）生产者可以扩大一组自我执行的共谋均衡。本文的结果被认为与对商业周期中卡特尔行为的广泛观察相一致。
In this paper cartel behavior in business cycles when some firms are vulnerable to bankruptcy in the downturns is investigated. This vulnerability would restrict the set of collusive equilibria that are feasible in a repeated game and possibly result in a breakdown, in recessions, of all collusive agreements. It is demonstrated, however, that the existence of a low-cost producer in the cartel could prevent this breakdown. By adjusting market shares across the business cycle (and thereby eliminating the possibility of bankruptcy for its inefficient rivals), this ('swing') producer could enlarge the set of self-enforcing collusive equilibria. The results of this paper are seen to be consistent with a wide range of observations on the behavior of cartels over the business cycle.