Delegation and Incentive Compensation
Delegation and Incentive Compensation
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DOI：
10.2308/accr.2002.77.2.379
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发表时间：
2002-04
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
Venky Nagar
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Venky Nagar
高层管理者面临着两个关键的组织设计选择：（1）向下级管理者下放多少权力;（2）如何设计激励性薪酬，以确保这些管理者不会滥用自己的自由裁量权。理论会计文献强调，最高管理层共同做出这两种选择，但很少有经验证据对这一论断。利用零售银行分支经理实践的独特数据库，本研究提供了一些关于授权和激励薪酬选择的联合性质的第一个证据。这两种选择的同时模型表明，高增长、波动和创新的银行将更多的权力下放给分支经理。反过来，权力更大的分支经理获得更多的激励性薪酬。然而，与委托代理理论相比，我没有发现任何证据表明激励补偿的程度在解释授权的程度方面起着重要作用。
Top management faces two key organizational design choices: (1) how much authority to delegate to lower‐level managers, and (2) how to design incentive compensation to ensure that these managers do not misuse their discretion. Theoretical accounting literature emphasizes that top management makes these two choices jointly, but there is little empirical evidence on this assertion. Capitalizing on a unique database of branch manager practices in retail banks, this study provides some of the first evidence on the joint nature of the delegation and incentive compensation choices for lower‐level managers. A simultaneous model of these two choices indicates that high‐growth, volatile, and innovative banks delegate more authority to branch managers. In turn, branch managers with more authority receive more incentive‐based pay. However, in contrast with principal‐agent theory, I find no evidence that the extent of incentive compensation plays a significant role in explaining the extent of delegation.