Cooperation and Status in Organizations
Cooperation and Status in Organizations
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DOI：
10.1111/j.1467-9779.2010.01472.x
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发表时间：
2010-08-01
影响因子：
1.1
通讯作者：
Wilson, Rick
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Eckel, Catherine C.;Fatas, Enrique;Wilson, Rick
我们报告的实验结果，旨在测试社会地位的影响，对公共利益的贡献，有和没有惩罚。这些实验是在一个“星星”网络中的四人小组中进行的，其中一个中心参与者观察，其他参与者也观察。这在游戏中强加了一种社会结构，并赋予中心玩家在群体中的领导角色，仅仅是因为被普遍观察。我们进一步操纵地位，将中心位置分配给在琐事测验中得分最高或最低的人。这些高地位和低地位的待遇进行了比较，我们发现，组织结构的影响，存在一个中心位置，取决于中心球员的地位。地位较高的玩家会得到更系统的关注和模仿。惩罚在这两种处理中有不同的效果，并且在高地位的情况下效果最差。
We report the results of experiments designed to test the effect of social status on contributions to a public good, with and without punishment. The experiments are conducted in four-person groups in a "star" network, where one central player observes and is observed by the others. This imposes a social structure on the game, and gives the central player a leadership role in the group, simply by virtue of being commonly observed. We further manipulate status by allocating the central position to the person who earns the highest, or the lowest, score on a trivia quiz. These high-status and low-status treatments are compared, and we find that the effect of organizational structure-the existence of a central position-depends on the status of the central player. Higher status players are attended to and mimicked more systematically. Punishment has differential effects in the two treatments, and is least effective in the high-status case.