Loyalty–Competence Trade‐offs for Top U.S. Federal Bureaucratic Leaders in the Administrative Presidency Era
Loyalty–Competence Trade‐offs for Top U.S. Federal Bureaucratic Leaders in the Administrative Presidency Era
复制标题
行政总统时代美国联邦最高官僚领导人的忠诚与能力权衡
DOI：
10.1111/psq.12525
复制
发表时间：
2019
影响因子：
0.8
通讯作者：
A. O'Connell
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
George A. Krause;A. O'Connell
我们试图以实证的方式描述总统在为美国联邦机构挑选高级官员时如何权衡忠诚度和专业知识。我们使用从卡特政府到乔治·W·布什总统的39个主要政府组织中1372名被任命人的提名前信息，以制定个人忠诚度和专业知识的衡量标准。从这些衡量标准中，我们发现，与涉及管理技能的技能相比，涉及特定于政策的专业知识的忠诚度-能力权衡要强得多。此外，这种忠诚度与能力的权衡对于最高级别的官僚领导职位来说比下级领导职位更为尖锐。尽管不那么明显，但对于行政部门机构相对于独立的监管委员会，以及与意识形态一致的机构相比，其政策活动在意识形态上与总统背道而驰的机构，这些权衡更大。
We seek to characterize empirically how presidents trade off loyalty and expertise in choosing top officials for U.S. federal agencies. We use pre-nomination information on 1372 appointees within 39 major government organizations from the Carter through G.W. Bush presidencies to develop individual measures of loyalty and expertise. From those measures, we find that loyalty-competence tradeoffs involving policy-specific expertise are much stronger compared to those involving managerial skills. In addition, these loyaltycompetence tradeoffs are more acute for top level bureaucratic leadership positions relative to subordinate counterparts. Although less pronounced, these tradeoffs are greater for executive branch agencies relative to independent regulatory commissions, and also for agencies whose policy activities are ideologically opposed to the president compared to ideologically aligned agencies.