Size, Power, and Electoral Systems: Exogenous Determinants of Legislative Procedural Choice
Size, Power, and Electoral Systems: Exogenous Determinants of Legislative Procedural Choice
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规模、权力和选举制度：立法程序选择的外生决定因素
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发表时间：
2006
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通讯作者：
Andrew J. Taylor
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作者：
Andrew J. Taylor
我使用一种独特的横断面方法和从世界各地55个立法机构收集的数据集，测试了关于外生制度与立法程序选择之间关系的假设。我把重点放在立法机构的三个根深蒂固的特征上，我们有理论上的理由认为这些特征会影响立法程序：规模、众议院的相对权力以及选择议员的方法。相对较小和强大的机构通常有分散的程序。在较小的程度上，我们可以说同样的议院有选举制度，鼓励个人投票。
I tested hypotheses about the relationship between exogenous institutions and legislative procedural choice using a unique cross-sectional approach and a dataset gleaned from 55 legislative bodies from around the world. I focused on three entrenched characteristics of legislative bodies that we have theoretical reason to think will shape procedures: size, the relative power of the chamber, and the method by which its members are selected. Relatively small and powerful bodies generally have decentralized procedures. To a lesser extent, we can say the same of chambers that have electoral systems that incentivize the personal vote.