Use of Insurance Against a Small Loss as an Incentive Strategy.
Use of Insurance Against a Small Loss as an Incentive Strategy.
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DOI：
10.1287/deca.2015.0314
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发表时间：
2015-09
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
Doctor JN
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Meeker D;Thompson C;Strylewicz G;Knight TK;Doctor JN
延长保修和买方保护计划的成功表明，小损失保险具有很高的决策效用。我们探讨了人们对小的损失机会高度厌恶的行为洞察力是否可以用来创造一个具有非常低期望值的强大激励。我们比较了为健康选择提供固定支付的个人和为健康选择提供保险的个人的决定。我们测试了对小损失的厌恶将导致非常高的健康行为吸收率以换取保险的预测。300名获得2美元奖金的参与者随机获得两种奖励中的一种，以完成预定的健康风险评估：(1)针对损失2美元奖金的1%风险的保险保证或(2)根据保险的预期价值进行固定支付。与固定支付条件相比，保险干预的参与者满足健康风险评估预约的可能性高出70% （p < 0.01）。要达到同样的行为效果，在保险上每花费1美元，就需要固定支付2.59美元。损失厌恶、概率加权和确定性效应可以解释这一结果。激励设计可能受益于利用保险范式。
The success of extended warranties and buyer protection plans suggests that insurance against a small loss has high decision utility. We explore whether the behavioral insight that people are highly averse to small chances of loss can be used to create a powerful incentive that has very low expected value. We compare decisions of individuals offered fixed payments for healthy choices to those offered insurance in exchange for healthy choices. We test the prediction that aversion to small losses will result in very high rates of health behavior uptake in exchange for insurance. Three hundred participants endowed with a $2 bonus randomly received one of two incentives for completing a scheduled health risk assessment: (1) an insurance guarantee against the 1% risk of losing the $2 bonus or (2) a fixed payment at the expected value of the insurance. Relative to the fixed payment condition, participants in the insurance intervention were 70% more likely to meet their health risk assessment appointment (p < 0.01). Fixed payments of $2.59 were needed for every $1 spent on insurance to achieve the same behavioral effect. Loss aversion, probability weighting, and the certainty effect may account for this result. Incentive design may benefit from utilizing an insurance paradigm.