Categories and Their Role in the Science of Emotion.
Categories and Their Role in the Science of Emotion.
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DOI:
10.1080/1047840x.2017.1261581
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发表时间:
2017
影响因子:
9.3
通讯作者:
Barrett LF
中科院分区:
文献类型:
--
作者:
Barrett LF
A perplexing situation persists in the science of emotion: There are a multitude of theories that vary a great deal from one another in almost every way imaginable: on the details of how an emotion should be defined; on where to draw the boundaries for what counts as an emotion and what does not; on which emotions matter; on how emotions are different from related concepts like mood, reward, and motivation; and on how various phenomena such as facial movements, physiological changes, and feelings should be treated. Theories even disagree on what observations and measurements counts as evidence for hypothesis testing. Scientists attempt to bring order to this dizzying cornucopia of theories in the same way that all living creatures deal with variation: We form categories.Scientists love to sort things into groups or sets and then name them. Aristotle famously catalogued all sorts of stuff—from animals to governments—into strictly ordered “typologies” or “taxonomies.” Carl Linnaeus created a taxonomy of plants, animals, and minerals that, to some extent, is still in use by biologists today. Physicist and novelist Alan Lightman eloquently described the lure of categorization: