Evidence Dependence of Fine Reductions in Corporate Leniency Programs
Evidence Dependence of Fine Reductions in Corporate Leniency Programs
复制标题
公司宽大处理计划中罚款减少的证据依赖性
DOI：
10.1628/093245610793524910
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发表时间：
2010
期刊：
影响因子：
0.4
通讯作者：
M. Walzl
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
E. Feess;M. Walzl
我们分析公司宽大处理项目是否应该给予第一个自我报告的公司完全豁免权，而不管所提供的证据的数量。我们区分两家公司，其中一家提供高证据，另一家提供低证据。我们表明，对低证据提供者也给予完全赦免是次优的。区分两家公司的罚款导致了相同比例的自我报告和更低的卡特尔频率。对于高证据提供者，完全赦免可以但不一定是最优的。
We analyze whether corporate leniency programs should grant full immunity to the first self-reporting firm regardless of the amount of evidence provided. We distinguish between two firms, one of them providing high and one only low evidence. We show that awarding full amnesty also to the low evidence provider is suboptimal. Distinguishing fines between the two firms leads to the same percentage of self-reporting and to a lower cartel frequency. For the high evidence provider, full amnesty can but does not have to be optimal.