Two Types of Semantic Presuppositions
Two Types of Semantic Presuppositions
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两种类型的语义预设
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发表时间：
2016
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通讯作者：
Nathan Klinedinst
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作者：
Nathan Klinedinst
通常带有预设的表达方式在特殊情况下其预设是否可以暂停或表现得好像它们只是蕴涵方面有所不同。在最近的术语中，据说有“软限制”，这允许暂停，和“硬限制”，这不允许（Chierchia和McConnell-Ginet，意义和语法，第2版。麻省理工学院出版社，剑桥，2000年;西蒙斯，在会话基础上的一些预设。在：语义学和语言学理论11，2001; Abusch，词汇替代作为语用预设的来源。在：杰克逊B（艾德）SALT XII会议记录。CLC Publications，Ithaca，NY，2002，following Karttunen，Some observations on factivity. Pap Linguist 5：55-69，1971; Stalnaker，Pragmatic presuppositions. In：Munitz MK，Unger PK（eds）Semantics and philosophy：essays.纽约大学出版社，纽约，1974年;威尔逊，前提和非真值条件语义学。学术，纽约，1975年）。大多数作者认为，预设的可悬置性反对它是相关表达的语义预设，而赞成把它当作一种语用推理。如果这是正确的，语义预设理论的解释负担似乎会减轻。另一方面，如果软触发器和硬触发器都被统一视为携带语义预设，则会出现两个逻辑上不同的问题。第一，首先说明为什么可以暂停。第二个是解释，鉴于这种情况，为什么暂停对于硬触发是不可能的或极其困难的。本文认为，第二个问题有一个简单的答案：软触发语必然包含语义预设，硬触发语不包含语义预设，说话人也不会随意调用语义预设。此外，制定这个答案使第一个问题的性质变得透明。
Expressions that normally carry presuppositions differ with respect to whether their presuppositions can be suspended, or behave as if they were mere entailments, in exceptional circumstances. In recent terminology there are said to be ‘soft triggers’, which allow for suspension, and ‘hard triggers’, which do not (Chierchia and McConnell-Ginet, Meaning and grammar, 2nd edn. MIT Press, Cambridge, 2000; Simons, On the conversational basis of some presuppositions. In: Proceedings of semantics and linguistics theory 11, 2001; Abusch, Lexical alternatives as a source of pragmatic presuppositions. In: Jackson B (ed) Proceedings of SALT XII. CLC Publications, Ithaca, NY, 2002, following Karttunen, Some observations on factivity. Pap Linguist 5:55–69, 1971; Stalnaker, Pragmatic presuppositions. In: Munitz MK, Unger PK (eds) Semantics and philosophy: essays. New York University Press, New York, 1974; Wilson, Presuppositions and non-truth-conditional semantics. Academic, New York, 1975). Most of these authors have assumed that the possibility of suspending a presupposition argues against its being a semantic presupposition of the relevant expression, and in favor of treating it as a pragmatic inference. If this is correct, the explanatory burden for the theory of semantic presuppositions would seem to be reduced. On the other hand, if both soft and hard triggers are to be treated uniformly as carrying semantic presuppositions, two logically distinct problems arise. The first is to give an account of why suspension is possible in the first place. The second is to explain, given that account, why suspension is impossible or extremely difficult for hard triggers. This paper suggests that there is a simple answer to the second problem: soft triggers necessarily entail their semantic presuppositions, hard triggers do not, and speakers do not invoke semantic presuppositions idly. In addition, formulating this answer makes transparent the nature of the first problem.