One breaker is enough: Hidden topology attacks on power grids
One breaker is enough: Hidden topology attacks on power grids
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一台断路器就够了：对电网的隐藏拓扑攻击
DOI：
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发表时间：
2015
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
S. Vishwanath
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Deepjyoti Deka;R. Baldick;S. Vishwanath
对电网仪表读数和断路器状态的协同网络攻击可能导致不正确的状态估计，从而导致电网不稳定。本文研究了攻击者通过改变输电线路上的断路器状态来影响电网拓扑估计的网络攻击。然而，攻击者无法改变任何仪表数据的值，只能阻止某些线路上记录的测量数据传输到控制中心。与标准数据攻击相比，所提出的框架对资源的需求有限，因此将网络攻击的范围扩展到电网，使其免受电表损坏的影响。我们使用一种新颖的基于图形着色的分析方法讨论了可行攻击的充分必要条件，并表明最优攻击只需要在一条传输线上改变断路器状态。通过对IEEE测试用例的模拟，证明了我们的攻击机制的有效性。
A coordinated cyber-attack on grid meter readings and breaker statuses can lead to incorrect state estimation that can subsequently destabilize the grid. This paper studies cyber-attacks by an adversary that changes breaker statuses on transmission lines to affect the estimation of the grid topology. The adversary, however, is incapable of changing the value of any meter data and can only block recorded measurements on certain lines from being transmitted to the control center. The proposed framework, with limited resource requirements as compared to standard data attacks, thus extends the scope of cyber-attacks to grids secure from meter corruption. We discuss necessary and sufficient conditions for feasible attacks using a novel graph-coloring based analysis and show that an optimal attack requires breaker status change at only ONE transmission line. The potency of our attack regime is demonstrated through simulations on IEEE test cases.