Plant Closings and Exit Behaviour in Declining Industries
Plant Closings and Exit Behaviour in Declining Industries
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衰退行业的工厂关闭和退出行为
作者：
S. Reynolds
工厂关闭和退出战略的公司在一个衰退的行业进行检查。一个动态的，博弈论模型。完美性准则被用来限制纳什均衡集。有两个关键的均衡结果。首先，当企业拥有相同数量的工厂时，高成本的工厂会比低成本的工厂先关闭。第二，一个更大的公司（即，一个经营更多工厂的公司）在一个较小的公司之前开始关闭工厂，只要成本差异不大。版权所有1988年由伦敦经济和政治科学学院。
The plant closing and exit strategies of firms operating in a declining industry are examined. A dynamic, game-theoretic model is utilized. The perfectness criterion is used to restrict the set of Nash equilibria. There are two key equilibrium results. First, when firms have the same number of plants, high-cost plants close before lower-cost plants. Second, a larger firm (i.e., a firm operating more plants) begins closing plants before a smaller firm, as long as cost differences are not large. Copyright 1988 by The London School of Economics and Political Science.