A Guide to Takeovers: Theory, Evidence and Regulation
A Guide to Takeovers: Theory, Evidence and Regulation
复制标题
收购指南：理论、证据和监管
作者：
R. Romano
在过去十年中，公司收购活动激增，最终导致对这些交易的监管加强。这些事件促使人们对收购的原因及其监管的影响进行了广泛的研究。本文调查和分析了经济文献和法律，试图根据经验证据确定哪些监管制度最有意义。虽然没有一个单一的理论是足以解释所有的收购，经验证据是最一致的解释收购作为价值最大化的事件，为目标公司的股东，提高社会效率。然而，经济学和公共政策并没有步调一致。由于管理人员往往对收购对第三方的影响提出未经证实的恐惧和怀疑，美国的监管往往阻碍收购，并加重收购的负担，就好像收购是非价值最大化的财富转移一样。作者的结论是，一个知情的阅读的文献表明，许多现有的监管机构是没有根据的。
The last decade witnessed an explosion of activity in the field of corporate takeovers, which ended in an environment of increased regulation of these transactions. These events have prompted extensive study into the causes for takeovers and the effects of their regulation. This article surveys and analyzes both the economic literature and the law in an attempt to determine which regulatory regimes make the most sense in light of the empirical evidence. Though no single theory is sufficient to explain all takeovers, the empirical evidence is most consistent with explanations of takeovers as value-maximizing events for target firm shareholders that enhance social efficiency. Economic learning and public policy, however, have not marched in step. Influenced by unsubstantiated fears and suspicions, often raised by managers, about the impact of takeovers on third parties, regulation in the United States has tended to thwart and burden takeovers as if they were non-value-maximizing wealth transfers. The author concludes that an informed reading of the literature suggests that much of the existing regulatory apparatus is unwarranted.