The Geopolitics of Geopolitical Space: Toward a Critical Social Theory of International Politics

The Geopolitics of Geopolitical Space: Toward a Critical Social Theory of International Politics
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地缘政治空间的地缘政治:走向国际政治的批判社会理论

DOI:
10.1177/030437548701200401
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发表时间:
1987
期刊:
Alternatives: Global, Local, Political
影响因子:
--
通讯作者:
Richard K. Ashley
Richard K. Ashley
中科院分区:
--
文献类型:
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作者:
Richard K. Ashley

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第一次接触时,对国际政治进行批判性社会调查的想法似乎是自相矛盾的。就其本质而言,国际政治领域似乎缺乏批判性探究所必须预设的东西。尽管批判性的社会探究涵盖了共同体背景下的所有社会行动,但国际政治领域似乎缺乏共同体的基础。有两个命题就足以说明这一矛盾。首先,各种形式的批判性社会科学方法本质上都是社群主义的。与社会调查的实证主义方法相反,值得贴上标签的方法强调社区共享的背景理解、技能和实践倾向,没有这些,就不可能解释行动、赋予意义、合法的实践、赋予代理人权力,并构成一个差异化的、高度结构化的社会现实。这种背景理解和预理解可能被称为胡塞尔的“生活世界”,海德格尔的“基本计划”,库恩的“学科矩阵”,伯杰和勒克曼的“日常生活的常识现实”,布迪厄的“惯习”,福柯的“episterne”或“dispositif”,或者哈贝马斯的简单“背景共识”。但无论是什么标签,批判的社会科学家都理解这种共享的背景知识和技能是“人类社会生活的本体论条件”(Giddens,1976:19),这些背景知识和技能被视为指导各方对他们的世界和他们自己的解释。
Upon first encounter, the idea of a critical social inquiry into international politics would appear to be a contradiction in terms. By its very nature, the sphere of international politics would seem to lack what a critical inquiry must presuppose. Whereas a critical social inquiry comprehends all social action against the background of community, the sphere of international politics would seem to lack a basis in community. Two propositions make the contradiction plain enough. The first is that critical social scientific approaches, in their various guises, are inherently communitarian. In contrast to positivistic approaches to social inquiry, approaches meriting the label stress the community-shared background understandings, skills, and practical predispositions without which it would be impossible to interpret action, assign meaning, legitimate practices, empower agents, and constitute a differentiated, highly structured social reality. Such background understandings and preunderstandings might be entitled a “lebenswelt” with Husserl, a “ground plan” with Heidegger, a “disciplinary matrix” with Kuhn, a “common sense reality of everyday life” with Berger and Luckmann, a “habitus” with Bourdieu, an “episterne” or “dispositif’ with Foucault, or simply a “background consensus” with Habermas. But whatever the label, critical social scientists understand such shared background knowledge and skills to be “the very ontological condition of human life in society as such” (Giddens, 1976: 19). Themselves the products of historical practices, such background knowledge and skills are seen to orient the parties’ interpretations of their worlds and themselves. They