PERSUASIVE ARGUMENTATION AND SOCIAL-COMPARISON AS DETERMINANTS OF ATTITUDE POLARIZATION
PERSUASIVE ARGUMENTATION AND SOCIAL-COMPARISON AS DETERMINANTS OF ATTITUDE POLARIZATION
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DOI：
10.1016/0022-1031(77)90002-6
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发表时间：
1977-01-01
影响因子：
3.5
通讯作者：
VINOKUR, A
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
BURNSTEIN, E;VINOKUR, A
我们的一些研究表明，说服论点理论本身是一个足够的解释极化。Sanders和Baron（Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 1977，13，303-314）批评了这项研究。更一般地说，他们认为，论证和比较都涉及，“有说服力的论点促进了社会比较所激发的转变。”我们认为他们的批评没有说服力。标准文献的相关部分进行审查，以证明社会比较既不是一个必要条件，也不是充分条件的两极分化。最后，我们推测如何说服论点理论可以扩展到论据贫乏的设置（例如，Asch的线比较情况）。
Several of our studies indicate that persuasive-arguments theory by itself is an adequate explanation of polarization. Sanders and Baron (Journal of Experimental Social Psychology1977,13, 303–314) criticize this research. More generally, they contend that both argumentation and comparison are involved, “with persuasive arguments facilitating the shifts motivated by social comparison.” We feel that their critique is unconvincing. Relevant portions of the standard literature are reviewed to demonstrate that social comparison is neither a necessary nor sufficient condition for polarization. Finally, we speculate about how persuasive-arguments theory could be extended to argument-poor settings (e.g., Asch's line comparison situation).