Bureaucratic Job Mobility and The Diffusion of Innovations
Bureaucratic Job Mobility and The Diffusion of Innovations
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官僚工作流动性与创新扩散
DOI：
10.1111/j.1540-5907.2008.00364.x
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发表时间：
2009
影响因子：
4.2
通讯作者：
Manuel P. Teodoro
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Manuel P. Teodoro
在创新研究中，政策企业家认识到新政策的潜在需求，并投入资源推动新政策的实施。但是，对政策性创业者的研究一般集中在创新的需求上，而忽视了政策性创业的供给方面。本文认为，官僚劳动力市场影响政策企业家的出现，从而影响政策创新在美国地方政府之间的扩散。对市警察局长和供水公司经理的调查分析将政府的雇用和晋升政策与他们采用专业时尚的创新联系起来。与从内部晋升的机构负责人相比，以对角线方式晋升到当前职位的机构负责人（来自另一个组织）更有可能发起这些创新。当政府对创新的需求满足了移动的管理者的供应时，官僚政策企业家就会出现，他们将自己职业的优先事项带到他们所服务的机构中。
In studies of innovation, policy entrepreneurs recognize latent demand for new policies and then expend resources to promote them. But studies of policy entrepreneurs have generally focused on the demand for innovation, while neglecting the supply side of policy entrepreneurship. This article argues that bureaucratic labor markets affect the emergence of policy entrepreneurs, and so affect the diffusion of policy innovations across local governments in the United States. Analysis of a survey of municipal police chiefs and water utility managers relates governments' hiring and promotion policies to their adoption of professionally fashionable innovations. Agency heads who advanced to their current positions diagonally (arriving from another organization) are more likely to initiate these innovations than are agency heads who were promoted from within. Bureaucratic policy entrepreneurs emerge where government demand for innovation meets a supply of mobile administrators, who carry the priorities of their professions into the agencies that they serve.