Coordination Failures under Incomplete Information and Global Games
Coordination Failures under Incomplete Information and Global Games
复制标题
不完全信息和全球博弈下的协调失败
DOI：
10.15057/7680
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发表时间：
2003
影响因子：
0.6
通讯作者：
K. Fukao
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
K. Fukao
Carlsson和货车达姆（1991，93）提出了一个全局博弈的概念，这是一个不完全信息博弈，在这个博弈中，实际的收益结构受到一个共同冲击的实现的影响，并且每个参与者都得到了这个冲击的嘈杂的私人信息。对于具有两种可能行动的n人对称博弈，其特征在于策略互补，他们表明，在噪声消失的全局博弈中，均衡博弈是唯一确定的。全球博弈的概念不仅是一个最精炼的均衡理论，而且是一个私人信息下协调失败的理论。从这个角度出发，本文使全局对策理论更具有一般性，更适用于此类问题。在两个具体的模型：投机性攻击模型和网络外部性模型的全球博弈理论的影响进行了研究。研究表明，无论是投机性攻击模型中的货币当局还是网络外部性模型中的中央计划者，都将偏好小噪声全球博弈中的均衡，而非相应的完全信息博弈中的最差均衡。因此，如果他们将极小极大原理应用于多重均衡问题，他们会欢迎小噪声的存在。
Carlsson and van Damme (1991, 93) presented a notion of a global game, which is an incomplete information game where the actual payoff structure is affected by a realization of a common shock and where each player gets noisy private information of the shock. For n -person symmetric games with two possible actions characterized by strategic complementarity, they showed that equilibrium play in a global game with vanishing noise is uniquely determined. The concept of global games is important not only as a theory of the most refined notion of equilibrium but also as a theory of coordination failures under private information. From this viewpoint, this paper makes the theory of global games more general and more applicable to such problems. The implications of the theory of global games are investigated in two specific models: a speculative attack model and a network externality model. It is shown that both the monetary authority in the speculative attack model and the central planner in the network externality model will prefer the equilibrium in a global game with small noise to the worst equilibrium in the corresponding complete information game. Therefore, they will welcome the existence of small noise, if they apply mini-max principle to multiple equilibrium problems.