Network sensing for security against link disruption attacks
Network sensing for security against link disruption attacks
复制标题
用于防御链路中断攻击的网络传感
DOI：
10.1109/allerton.2016.7852316
复制
发表时间：
2016
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
Saurabh Amin
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Mathieu Dahan;L. Perelman;Saurabh Amin
我们考虑的问题，检测安全故障所造成的资源受限的攻击者使用随机感测策略。我们提出了一个博弈论模型，其中攻击者的目标（分别）。防御者）是最大化未检测到的攻击的数量（分别是，检测）在网络上。我们的博弈在战略上等同于零和博弈。因此，纳什均衡（NE）的解决方案可以通过解决两个线性规划（LP）问题。然而，对于大规模网络，均衡策略的特征并不容易处理。我们假设防守方（或防守方）。攻击者的）检测（或攻击）预算相对于网络的大小是有限的。在此假设下，我们提供了结构性的结果的基础上的均衡收益的球员的资源和最小集覆盖的大小。我们证明了防御者的一个均衡策略是选择一个随机感知策略，该策略跨越一个最小集合覆盖。这一结果显著提高了NE计算的易处理性，并为对抗环境中的网络感知提供了一些实用的见解。
We consider the problem of detecting security failures caused by a resource-constrained attacker using randomized sensing strategies. We propose a game-theoretic model in which the objective of the attacker (resp. defender) is to maximize the number of undetected attacks (resp. detections) on the network. Our game is strategically equivalent to a zero-sum game. Thus, the Nash Equilibria (NE) solution can be found by solving two linear programming (LP) problems. Still, characterization of equilibrium strategies is not tractable for large-scale networks. We assume that the defender's (resp. attacker's) detection (resp. attack) budget is limited relative to the size of the network. Under this assumption, we provide structural results on the equilibrium payoffs based on the players' resources and the size of the minimum set covers. We show that an equilibrium strategy of the defender is to choose a randomized sensing strategy that spans a minimum set cover. This result significantly improves the tractability of NE computation, and provides some practical insights on network sensing in adversarial environments.