Solving the Skeptical Problem
Solving the Skeptical Problem
复制标题
解决怀疑的问题
DOI：
10.1093/oso/9780199564477.003.0001
复制
发表时间：
1995
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
Keith DeRose
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Keith DeRose
摘自诺齐克对知识和怀疑主义的描述。根据 SCA 的说法，我相信自己不是 BIV 的问题——我确实有这样的信念，就像我们大多数人一样——是我会有这种信念（我不是 BIV），即使它是错误的（即使我是 BIV）。正是这一点使得我很难声称自己不是 BIV。因为，根据 SCA 的说法，当我们认为我们对 P 的信念是即使 P 是错误的时候我们也会持有的信念时，我们有一种非常强烈的普遍倾向，即认为我们不知道 P。假设如果 P 为假，S 也会相信 P，那么 S 对 P 的信念是不敏感的。 SCA 的概括可以重述如下：当我们认为 S 对 P 的信念不敏感时，我们倾向于判断 S 不知道 P。值得注意的是，这种普遍倾向解释了非哲学怀疑论假设的运作，这些假设远没有 BIV 假设甚至画骡子假设那么激进。正因为如此，这可以解释为什么，尽管我倾向于说我知道公牛队昨晚赢得了比赛，因为我在一份报纸上读到了结果，但我仍然强烈地倾向于承认（温和的）怀疑论断，即我不知道报纸对哪支球队获胜的判断是否有误：我意识到，我相信报纸没有错，即使它是错误的（即使报纸是错误的），我也会坚持这一信念。事实上，在遇到几个插入“H”槽的具有不同怀疑假设的人工智能实例（例如，BIV、彩绘骡子和错误的论文假设）后，人们会了解什么是有效的怀疑假设，从而形成一种构建令人信服的人工智能实例的能力。为了使 AI 的第二个前提令人信服，H 与 0 不相容通常就足够了（尽管不是必要的）。但是第一个前提呢？为了使其具有说服力，我们本能地寻找一种假设，使听者既相信该假设未成立，又承认即使该假设成立，她也会持有这一信念。当听到这个假设时，人们通常会情不自禁地将自己投射到其中。如果出现这种情况，我会觉得怎么样？嗯，在我看来，几乎（或有时完全）是这样。那么，如果出现这样的“奇怪”情况，我会相信什么呢？几乎（或完全）我所采取的-
ed from Nozick's account of knowledge and skepticism. According to SCA, the problem with my belief that I'm not a BIV-and I do have such a belief, as do most of us-is that I would have this belief (that I'm not a BIV) even if it were false (even if I were one). It is this that makes it hard to claim to know that I'm not a BIV. For, according to SCA, we have a very strong general, though not exceptionless, inclination to think that we don't know that P when we think that our belief that P is a belief we would hold even if P were false. Let's say that S's belief that P is insensitive if S would believe that P if P were false. SCA's generalization can then be restated as follows: We tend to judge that S doesn't know that P when we think S's belief that P is insensitive. As is well worth noting, this general inclination explains the operation of nonphilosophical skeptical hypotheses that are far less radical than the BIV hypothesis or even the painted mule hypothesis. Just so, it serves to explain why, even though I feel inclined to say that I know the Bulls won their game last night because I read the result in a single newspaper, I still feel strongly pulled toward admitting the (mildly) skeptical claim that I don't know that the paper isn't mistaken about which team won: I realize that my belief that the paper isn't mistaken is a belief I would hold even if it were false (even if the paper were mistaken). Indeed, after encountering a couple of instances of AI with different skeptical hypotheses plugged into the 'H' slot (for example, the BIV, the painted mules, and the mistaken paper hypotheses), one develops a sense of what makes for an effective skeptical hypothesis and, thus, an ability to construct convincing instances of Al oneself. To make AI's second premise convincing, it is usually sufficient (though not necessary) that H be incompatible with 0. But what about the first premise? To make it convincing, we instinctively look for a hypothesis that elicits in the listener both the belief that the hypothesis doesn't obtain and an acknowledgement that this belief is one she would hold even if the hypothesis did obtain. Upon hearing the hypothesis, typically one can't help but projecting oneself into it. How would things seem to me if that situation obtained? Well, pretty much (or sometimes exactly) as they actually seem to me. And, so, what would I believe if such a "strange" situation obtained? Pretty much (or exactly) what I ac-