Diffusional Side-Channel Leakage From Unrolled Lightweight Block Ciphers: A Case Study of Power Analysis on PRINCE
Diffusional Side-Channel Leakage From Unrolled Lightweight Block Ciphers: A Case Study of Power Analysis on PRINCE
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DOI：
10.1109/tifs.2020.3033441
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发表时间：
2021-01-01
影响因子：
6.8
通讯作者：
Homma, Naofumi
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Yli-Mayry, Ville;Ueno, Rei;Homma, Naofumi
本研究研究了在选择输入攻击场景中，在分组密码的展开硬件实现的内轮中观察到的新的侧信道泄漏。侧信道泄漏发生在第一轮中，并且可以在后面的内轮中观察到，因为它是由两个连续输入之间的差异引起的路径激活偏差引起的。因此，即使对于在涉及泄漏的回合中配备了对策（在毛刺传播方面分离电路的掩蔽和/或去毛刺器）的展开实施，利用泄漏的新攻击也是可能的。我们通过使用在现场可编程门阵列 (FPGA) 上实现的完全展开的 PRINCE 密码硬件进行的一组实验来验证这种独特的侧信道泄漏的存在。此外，我们验证了展开实施对策的有效性并评估了硬件成本，即阈值实施（TI）对策。
This study investigates a new side-channel leakage observed in the inner rounds of an unrolled hardware implementation of block ciphers in a chosen-input attack scenario. The side-channel leakage occurs in the first round and it can be observed in the later inner rounds because it arises from path activation bias caused by the difference between two consecutive inputs. Therefore, a new attack that exploits the leakage is possible even for unrolled implementations equipped with countermeasures (masking and/or deglitchers that separate the circuit in terms of glitch propagation) in the round involving the leakage. We validate the existence of such a unique side-channel leakage through a set of experiments with a fully unrolled PRINCE cipher hardware, implemented on a field-programmable gate array (FPGA). In addition, we verify the validity and evaluate the hardware cost of a countermeasure for the unrolled implementation, namely the Threshold Implementation (TI) countermeasure.