Welfare Analysis of Dynamic Voluntary Advertising in Covered Markets
Welfare Analysis of Dynamic Voluntary Advertising in Covered Markets
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发表时间：
2014-12
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通讯作者：
Yohei Tenryu;Keita Kamei
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作者：
Yohei Tenryu;Keita Kamei
在这项研究中，我们分析了一个动态的双寡头博弈中，企业可以使用广告和价格作为竞争工具。假设市场是完全覆盖的，因为所有消费者都从两家公司之一购买产品。我们假设广告创造了正外部性。因此，每个公司都自愿说服消费者购买其产品，而不是其他公司的产品，即使这些公司在价格上相互竞争。考虑了两种情况：内部情况和角点情况。在这种情况下，我们调查消费者偏好和企业技术水平的变化如何影响广告，利润和经济福利，并强调这两种情况之间的差异。
In this study, we analyze a dynamic duopoly game in which firms can use advertising and price as competitive tools. The market is assumed to be completely covered in the sense that all consumers purchase a product from one of the two firms. We assume that advertising creates a positive externality. Thus, each firm voluntarily advertises to persuade consumers to buy its products over those of the other firm, even though the firms compete with one another in price. Two cases are considered: an interior case and a corner case. In this situation, we investigate how changes in consumer preference and firm technology level affect advertising, profits, and economic welfare and highlight the differences between the two cases.