Subgame perfect implementation of stable matchings in marriage problems
Subgame perfect implementation of stable matchings in marriage problems
复制标题
婚姻问题中稳定匹配的子博弈完美实现
DOI：
10.1007/s00355-007-0272-x
复制
发表时间：
2008
影响因子：
0.9
通讯作者：
Quan Wen
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Sang;Quan Wen
我们研究了序贯匹配机制，一个广泛的形式博弈的完美信息，实现稳定匹配的婚姻问题。当Eeckhout（Econ Lett 69：1-8，2000）关于存在唯一稳定匹配的条件成立时，该机制的SPE（子博弈完美均衡）导致唯一稳定匹配.这个结果并不适用于违反Eeckhout条件的偏好，即使匹配问题具有唯一的稳定匹配。然后我们引入了一个较弱的条件，称为α M条件，在该条件下，男人先动机制的SPE结果是男人最优稳定匹配。α M条件是人最优稳定匹配对人是Pareto最优的充要条件。
We study a sequential matching mechanism, an extensive form game of perfect information, to implement stable matchings in marriage problems. It is shown that the SPE (subgame perfect equilibrium) of this mechanism leads to the unique stable matching when the Eeckhout (Econ Lett 69:1–8, 2000) condition for the existence of a unique stable matching holds. This result does not extend to preferences that violate the Eeckhout condition, even if the matching problem has a unique stable matching. We then introduce a weaker condition, called theαMcondition, under which the SPE outcome of the men-move-first mechanism is the men-optimal stable matching. TheαMcondition is necessary and sufficient for the men-optimal stable matching to be Pareto optimal for men.