A Stochastic Inventory Model for a Random Yield Supply Chain with Wholesale-Price and Shortage Penalty Contracts
A Stochastic Inventory Model for a Random Yield Supply Chain with Wholesale-Price and Shortage Penalty Contracts
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DOI：
10.1142/s0217595918500409
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发表时间：
2018-12
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
Kimitoshi Sato;Kyoko Yagi;M. Shimazaki
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文献类型：
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作者：
Kimitoshi Sato;Kyoko Yagi;M. Shimazaki
本文分析了一个无限时间、单产品、连续时间、有供需风险的库存模型，以评估分销商和供应商之间协调生产策略的影响。研究了一个批发价格契约和一个短缺惩罚契约作为库存补充系统的协调机制。需求过程由具有漂移的布朗运动描述，该库存模型可以表示为补货量不确定的脉冲控制问题。我们证明了在一定的假设下，存在最优的订货和生产策略。我们还提供了一些数值例子来研究这些协调机制对期望成本和最优策略的影响。计算结果表明：（1）分散情况下的生产量高于集中情况下的生产量;（2）与独立决策方式相比，集中决策方式下的联合总成本较低;（3）短缺惩罚契约对分散系统中整个供应链的总成本具有有利的影响。
This paper analyzes an infinite horizon, single-product, continuous-time inventory model with supply and demand risks to evaluate the impact of coordinating a production policy between a distributor and a supplier. We consider a wholesale-price contract and a shortage penalty contract as a coordination mechanisms in an inventory replenishment system. The demand process is described by a Brownian motion with drift, and this inventory model can be formulated as an impulse control problem with uncertain replenishment quantities. We show that under some assumptions, there exist optimal ordering and production policies. We also provide some numerical examples to investigate the effect of these coordination mechanisms on the expected costs and the optimal policies. The computational experiments reveal that (i) the production quantity in decentralized case is higher than that in the centralized case, (ii) the centralized approach strategy results in the lower joint total cost as compared with independent decision approaches, and (iii) the shortage penalty contract has a beneficial effect on the total cost to the entire supply chain in decentralized system.