The Value of Prominent Directors: Corporate Governance and Bank Access in Transitional Japan
The Value of Prominent Directors: Corporate Governance and Bank Access in Transitional Japan
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杰出董事的价值：转型期日本的公司治理和银行准入
DOI：
10.1086/340408
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发表时间：
2002
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
J. Ramseyer
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Y. Miwa;J. Ramseyer
尽管观察人士敦促转型经济体依赖银行而不是股票市场，但在20世纪初的日本，大公司并不依赖债务。相反，他们出售股票。为了缓解机构的懈怠，他们有时会招募知名投资者进入董事会。在此背景下，我们使用棉纺企业的数据来探索董事会构成与盈利能力之间的关系。首先，聘请杰出董事的公司在接下来的几年里利润更高。我们假设这些董事具备监督技能和证明可信度：他们知道会发生什么，知道何时以及如何进行干预，并且拥有证明公司质量可信所必需的声誉。其次，公司并没有通过任命能够接触到银行或纺纱技术的董事来进一步提高盈利能力。我们的结论是，这些公司可能在没有董事会关系的情况下获得了资金和技术援助。
Although observers urge transitional economies to rely on banks rather than stock markets, in early twentieth‐century Japan, large firms did not rely on debt. Instead, they sold stock. To mitigate agency slack, they sometimes recruited prominent investors to their boards. In this context, we use data on cotton‐spinning firms to explore the relationship between board composition and profitability. First, firms that hired prominent directors had higher profits in succeeding years. We hypothesize that these directors brought monitoring skills and certifying credibility: they knew what to expect, knew when and how to intervene, and had the reputations necessary to certify firm quality credibly. Second, firms did not further increase their profitability by appointing directors with access to a bank or to spinning technology. We conclude that the firms probably had access to funds and technological assistance without board connections.