The Tragedy of the Anti-commons in the Long Run in a Common-resource Economy
The Tragedy of the Anti-commons in the Long Run in a Common-resource Economy
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公共资源经济中长期反公地的悲剧
DOI：
10.1111/j.1468-5876.2012.00571.x
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发表时间：
2012
影响因子：
1.2
通讯作者：
Kozo Harimaya
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Takao Ohkawa;Tetsuya Shinkai;Makoto Okamura;Kozo Harimaya
我们从福利的角度考察了长期的反公地悲剧，即总产出不足。我们开发了一个垂直结构的公共资源模型：上游所有者市场和下游用户市场。我们比较了两种情况：长期市场和次优方案。我们发现：（i）当需求参数大（小）时，用户数量不足（过多）;（ii）当需求参数大（小）时，反公地悲剧在长期内发生（不发生）。
We examine the tragedy of the anti-commons in the long run that is defined as the total output being insufficient from the welfare viewpoint. We develop a common-resource model with a vertical structure: an upstream owners’ market and a downstream users’ market. We compare two situations: a long-run market and a second-best scenario. We find the following: (i) the number of users is insufficient (excessive) when the demand parameter is large (small); and (ii) the tragedy of the anti-commons in the long-run occurs (does not occur) when the demand parameter is large (small).