To pool or not to pool: Equilibrium, pricing and regulation
To pool or not to pool: Equilibrium, pricing and regulation
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联合还是不联合：均衡、定价和监管
DOI：
10.1016/j.trb.2021.07.001
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发表时间：
2021
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
Nie, Yu
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Zhang, Kenan;Nie, Yu
我们研究了一家交通网络公司（TNC），该公司在聚合移动服务市场中提供按需的单人和联营电子冰雹服务，同时与过境乘客竞争。市场均衡是建立在空间驾驶员-乘客匹配模型的基础上的，该模型确定了单人和拼车的乘客等待时间。在适当的条件下，我们证明了该系统总有一个平衡解。建立在市场均衡的基础上，分析和比较了三种不同的定价问题，即（i）利润最大化，（ii）受监管约束的利润最大化，（iii）受收入中性约束的社会福利最大化。一个全面的案例研究是使用收集在芝加哥市的跨国公司的数据。我们发现，当需求高但供应不足时，池是可取的。然而，其益处随着平均途中绕行时间（即，单人旅行和合伙旅行的平均持续时间之间的差异）增加。在没有监管的情况下，混合策略--提供单人和拼车--不仅在大多数场景下实现了最高的利润和出行产量，还获得了更高的社会福利。最低工资政策可以在短期内改善社会福利。然而，从长远来看，跨国公司可能会限制司机的规模，从而使政策适得其反，甚至将社会福利推到不受管制的水平以下。此外，最低工资政策将网约车的供需维持在人为的高水平，抑制了集体模式（公交和拼车）的使用，从而加剧了交通拥堵。一项惩罚单独乘车的拥堵税政策促进了拼车，但可能损害社会福利。但是，它承诺在与最低工资政策共同实施时增加社会福利和汇集比率。
We study a transportation network company (TNC) that offers on-demand solo and pooling e-hail services in an aggregate mobility service market, while competing with transit for passengers. The market equilibrium is established based on a spatial driver–passenger matching model that determines the passenger wait time for both solo and pooling rides. We prove, under mild conditions, this system always has an equilibrium solution. Built on the market equilibrium, three variants of pricing problems are analyzed and compared, namely, (i) profit maximization, (ii) profit maximization subject to regulatory constraints, and (iii) social welfare maximization subject to a revenue-neutral constraint. A comprehensive case study is constructed using TNC data collected in the city of Chicago. We found pooling is desirable when demand is high but supply is scarce. However, its benefit diminishes quickly as the average en-route detour time (i.e., the difference between the average duration of solo and pooling trips) increases. Without regulations, a mixed strategy—providing both solo and pooling rides—not only achieves the highest profit and trip production in most scenarios, but also gains higher social welfare. The minimum wage policy can improve social welfare in the short term. However, in the long run, the TNC could react by limiting the size of the driver pool, and consequently, render the policy counterproductive, even pushing social welfare below the unregulated level. Moreover, by maintaining the supply and demand of ride-hail at an artificially high level, the minimum wage policy tends to exacerbate traffic congestion by depressing the use of collective modes (transit and pooling). A congestion tax policy that penalizes solo rides promotes pooling, but may harm social welfare. However, it promises to increase both social welfare and pooling ratio when jointly implemented with the minimum wage policy.