Three Scenarios for the Revision of Epistemic States
Three Scenarios for the Revision of Epistemic States
复制标题
认知状态修正的三种情景
DOI：
10.1093/logcom/exm092
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发表时间：
2008
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
D. Dubois
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
D. Dubois
该立场论文讨论了解释迭代信念修订问题的困难。迭代信念修订的公理经常被视为AGM公理的扩展，一旦收到一系列输入，不仅可能改变了信念集，而且会改变修订运营商基础的认识论内在关系。迭代的信念修订是前提是，最近的投入比最近的投入优先。我们认为，这种迭代修订的观点与Gardenfors和Makinson的建议是不符的，这种信念修订和非单调推理是同一枚硬币的两个方面。目前尚不清楚非单调推理会修改默认规则中隐含的可能世界的排名。我们基于对工作和输入信息的认知内部理解的特定解释进行修订的三个不同的修订范式。如果认知的内在源于默认规则，而输入是一个特定的证据，那么AGM修订是改变合理结论的问题，并且迭代修订没有任何意义。但是，如果认知的根深蒂固编码不确定的事实证据和输入信息，那么迭代的修订将减少到优先合并。通过添加新的默认规则，描述背景信息的有条件知识基础的第三个问题与修订相对应，与修订相对应。将三种情况与概率推理框架中的类似问题进行了比较。
This position paper discusses the difficulty of interpreting the iterated belief revision problem. Axioms of iterated belief revision are often presented as extensions of the AGM axioms, upon receiving a sequence of inputs, likely to alter not only the belief set, but also the epistemic entrenchment relation underlying the revision operator. Iterated belief revision presupposes that more recent inputs have priority over less recent ones. We argue that this view of iterated revision is at odds with the suggestion of Gardenfors and Makinson, that belief revision and non-monotonic reasoning are two sides of the same coin. It is not clear that non-monotonic reasoning modifies the ranking of possible worlds implicit in default rules. We lay bare three different paradigms of revision based on specific interpretations of the epistemic entrenchment implicitly at work and of the input information. If the epistemic entrenchment stems from default rules and the input is a specific piece of evidence, then AGM revision is a matter of changing plausible conclusions, and iterated revision makes no sense. However, if the epistemic entrenchment encodes uncertain factual evidence and the input information as well, then iterated revision reduces to prioritized merging. A third problem where iteration makes sense corresponds to the revision, by the addition of new default rules, of a conditional knowledge base describing background information. The three scenarios are compared with similar problems in the framework of probabilistic reasoning.