Risk rationing and wealth effects in credit markets: Theory and implications for agricultural development
Risk rationing and wealth effects in credit markets: Theory and implications for agricultural development
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DOI：
10.1111/j.1467-8276.2007.01116.x
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发表时间：
2008-05-01
影响因子：
4.2
通讯作者：
Guirkinger, Catherine
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Boucher, Stephen R.;Carter, Michael R.;Guirkinger, Catherine
我们开发了一个模型，表明信息不对称会导致两种类型的信贷配给：传统的数量配给，和“风险配给”，即农民能够借到钱，但只有在高抵押合同，为他们提供较低的预期福利比一个安全的，生存的活动。在探讨其发病率与财富，我们表明，风险配给具有重要的政策含义。具体而言，土地所有权的发放将只是部分有效，因为它不会提高生产者在道德风险约束下提供贷款担保的意愿。加强农业投资和农业信贷市场运作的努力必须超越土地所有权，还必须处理风险。
We develop a model that shows that asymmetric information can result in two types of credit rationing: conventional quantity rationing, and "risk rationing," whereby farmers are able to borrow but only under high-collateral contracts that offer them lower expected well-being than a safe, subsistence activity. After exploring its incidence with respect to wealth, we show that risk rationing has important policy implications. Specifically, land titling will be only partially effective because it does not enhance producers' willingness to offer up the collateral needed to secure loans under moral hazard constraints. Efforts to enhance agricultural investment and the working of agricultural credit markets must step beyond land titling and also deal with risk.