Fixed cost allocation in two-stage system using DEA from a noncooperative view
Fixed cost allocation in two-stage system using DEA from a noncooperative view
复制标题
从非合作角度使用DEA在两阶段系统中固定成本分配
DOI：
10.1007/s00291-021-00643-y
复制
发表时间：
2021
期刊：
影响因子：
2.7
通讯作者：
Zongrun Wang
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Qingxian An;Ping Wang;Honglin Yang;Zongrun Wang
利用数据包络分析（DEA）方法解决了固定成本在具有两阶段网络结构的决策单元（DMU）之间的分配问题。固定成本分配是组织面临的一个突出问题，也是DEA最重要的应用之一。它不仅存在于单级系统中，而且存在于两级网络系统中，如真实的情况下的银行系统，包括存款过程和贷款过程。然而，分支银行之间往往出于自身利益而相互竞争。针对两阶段网络系统，考虑决策单元之间的非合作博弈关系，设计了一种公平分配方案。将满意度和非合作博弈的思想引入到分配模型中。在非合作框架下，我们将决策单元的收益定义为两个子阶段满意度的乘积，每个成员都是非合作的，自私地寻求自己的收益最大化。分配方案的决策单元和子阶段是由最终的竞争收益。通过一个真实的案例分析，说明了所提方法的适用性。
This paper uses the data envelopment analysis (DEA) approach to solve the issue of allocating fixed costs among a set of decision-making units (DMUs) with two-stage network structure. Fixed cost allocation is a prominent issue that is encountered by organizations, and it is one of the most important applications of DEA. It exists not only in single-stage systems but in two-stage network systems, such as bank systems in real situations, which comprises the deposits process and lending process. However, branch banks often compete with one another out of self-interest. The objective of this paper is to design a fair allocation scheme for two-stage network systems and considering the noncooperative game relationship among DMUs. The idea of satisfaction degree and noncooperative game theory is integrated into the proposed allocation model. In the noncooperative framework, we define a DMU’s payoff as the product of two substage satisfaction degree, and every member is noncooperative and selfishly seeks to maximize its own payoff. The allocation plan to DMUs and substages is determined by the final competition payoff. A real case is analyzed to illustrate the applicability of the proposed approaches.