Domestic Constraints Tactics in the Council of the EU
Domestic Constraints Tactics in the Council of the EU
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欧盟理事会的国内限制策略
DOI：
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发表时间：
2013
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
Markus Johansson
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Markus Johansson
国内限制是否会导致欧盟理事会的议价能力？在罗伯特·普特南的两层博弈论中，他在托马斯·谢林关于弱点悖论的理论的支持下认为，当国家进行国际谈判时，国内约束可以成为讨价还价能力的来源。他们的论点是，谈判者通过声称存在国内限制，可以迫使对手做出让步以达成协议。这些理论最初是为纯粹的政府间谈判而设计的，欧盟理事会也在寻求这些理论的适用范围。这项研究得出的结论是，国内限制不会导致欧盟理事会讨价还价成功。本文对两个要点提出了质疑，从而有助于理论的发展。首先，之前的研究并没有充分关注谈判者是否真正传达了他们的国内限制，而这被认为是谈判有效的先决条件。其次，以往的研究没有充分适应国内约束理论，因为欧盟理事会的决策不包含正式的批准约束和国内行为体的否决权，这对理论提出了挑战。通过关注（1）国内约束的沟通和（2）理论适应来解决先前研究中发现的缺点，以确定其他互动模式，较少关注叛逃威胁，而更多地关注如何根据其他逻辑和机制使用国内约束论点。新的调查数据被提出并用于测试欧盟理事会是否传达了国内限制，并辅以定性访谈，解决如何使用国内限制论点的问题。该调查对来自所有 27 个欧盟成员国的 249 名受访者进行了调查，这些受访者在欧盟筹备机构理事会的各个政策领域工作，并对理事会中的成员国随员进行了定性访谈。经验表明，国内约束论点确实被成员国谈判者所使用，但其方式并非威胁。通过观察成员国和政策领域之间的差异，还寻求对国内限制沟通模式变化的解释。工作正在进行中！为第十三届欧盟研究协会双年度会议准备的论文，
Do domestic constraints lead to bargaining power in the Council of the EU? In Robert Putnam’s two-level game theory, he argued with support from Thomas Schelling’s theory on the paradox of weakness, that domestic constraints can be a source of bargaining power when states negotiate internationally. Their argument is that negotiators, by claiming domestic constraints, can force adversaries to make concessions in order to reach agreement. Initially designed for purely intergovernmental negotiations, the bounds of applicability of the theories have been sought also in the Council of the EU. This research has concluded that domestic constraints do not result in bargaining success in the EU Council. This paper questions the previous research on two main points thereby contributing to developing the theory. First, previous research has not sufficiently focused on whether negotiators actually communicate their domestic constraints, which is argued to be a prerequisite for it to be effective. Secondly, previous studies do not sufficiently adapt the domestic constraints theories to the fact that the EU Council decision-making does not contain formal ratification constraints and veto power for domestic actors and as such is a challenge for the theory. The identified shortcomings of previous research are addressed by focusing on (1) the communication of domestic constraints and (2) on theoretical adaptation in order to identify other modes of interactions that focus less on threats of defection and more on how the domestic constraints argument can be used according to other logics and mechanisms. New survey data is presented and used to test whether domestic constraints are communicated in the Council of the EU and it is complemented with qualitative interviews addressing the question on how the domestic constraints argument is used. The survey was conducted with 249 respondents from all 27 EU member states working in the Council of the EU preparatory bodies over a variety of policy areas and qualitative interviews were done with member state attaches in the Council. Empirically, it is indicated that the domestic constraints argument indeed is used by member state negotiators but by other modes than threats. Explanations are also sought for the variation in the patterns of communication of domestic constraints by looking at differences between member states and policy areas. Work in progress! Paper prepared for the 13 th European Union Studies Association biennial conference,