The Content–Force Distinction
The Content–Force Distinction
复制标题
内容与力量的区别
DOI：
10.1007/s11098-007-9080-5
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发表时间：
2007
影响因子：
1.3
通讯作者：
P. Hanks
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
P. Hanks
引言 人们普遍认为，判断或断言不是陈述句命题内容的一部分。这种区别是弗雷格著作的一个贯穿主题。它很早就出现在《Begriffschrift》中，作为水平内容笔画和垂直判断笔画之间的区别。很久以后，它在 1915 年未发表的手稿《我的基本逻辑见解》中作为主要观点出现：“当某件事被判断为事实时，我们总是可以剔除出被认为是真实的想法；判断行为不构成其中的一部分”（1979，251）。内容与力量的区别几乎以某种形式出现在弗雷格的所有哲学著作中，并且是他语言观点的核心（尽管，正如我们稍后将看到的，弗雷格从未以最普遍的形式持有这种区别）。弗雷格关于内容与力量区别的论据之一是，指示性句子可以作为条件句的前件或后件而无需被判断或断言而被说出。拿他的例子来说，“如果被告在行为发生时在罗马，他就没有犯下谋杀罪”（1918-19b，375），这句话既不是断言被告在行为发生时在罗马，也不是他没有犯下谋杀罪。吉奇将这一论点称为“弗雷格点”，并用它来质疑对“故意”、“好”和“真实”等词的言语行为分析（1960，1965）。 1 弗雷格的区别也是当前语义学思考的核心。普遍的观点是，意义理论（至少）是一个由两部分组成的理论，一部分处理句子的内容，另一部分处理这些句子在言语行为中使用的力量。达米特说，“意义和指称理论应该通过对可能附加在句子上的各种形式的语言力量的解释来补充：力量理论因此提供了对实际言语中句子实际构成的各种用途的解释”（1973，416）。 2 内容与力量的区别在当前言语行为理论中也占据着核心地位。它被编入塞尔的模式“F(p)”中，其中“F”代表力，“p”代表命题……
Introduction It is a commonplace to hold that judgment or assertion is no part of the propositional content of an indicative sentence. This distinction is a running theme of Frege's writings. It appears early on in the " Begriffschrift " as the distinction between the horizontal content stroke and the vertical judgment stroke. Much later it shows up as the leading point in an unpublished 1915 manuscript titled " My basic logical insights " : " When something is judged to be the case we can always cull out the thought that is recognized as true; the act of judgment forms no part of this " (1979, 251). The content-force distinction appears in some form or other in virtually all of Frege's philosophical writings and is at the core of his views on language (although, as we'll see in a moment, Frege never held the distinction in its most general form). One of Frege's arguments for the content-force distinction is the fact that an indicative sentence can be uttered, without being judged or asserted, as the antecedent or consequent of a conditional. To use his example, an utterance of " If the accused was in Rome at the time of the deed, he did not commit the murder " (1918-19b, 375) is neither an assertion that the accused was in Rome at the time of the deed nor that he did not commit the murder. Geach dubbed this argument " the Frege point " and used it with great effect to discredit speech-act analyses of words like 'intentional', 'good' and 'true' (1960, 1965). 1 Frege's distinction is also at the core of current thinking about semantics. The prevailing view is that a theory of meaning is (at least) a two-part theory, one part dealing with the contents of sentences and the other with the forces with which those sentences are used in speech acts. Dummett says that " [t]he theory of sense and reference is then to be supplemented by an account of the various forms of linguistic force that may be attached to a sentence: the theory of force thus supplies an account of the various uses 2 that are actually made of sentences in actual speech " (1973, 416). 2 The content-force distinction also occupies a central place in current speech-act theory. It is codified in Searle's schema 'F(p)', where 'F' stands for force and 'p' for propositional …