Will geographical indications supply excessive quality

Will geographical indications supply excessive quality
复制标题

地理标志是否会提供过多的品质

DOI:
10.1093/erae/jbr056
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发表时间:
2012
影响因子:
3.4
通讯作者:
R. Sexton
R. Sexton
中科院分区:
经济学2区
文献类型:
--
作者:
P. Mérel;R. Sexton

文献摘要

被引文献

相似文献

本研究调查了负责确定地理标志产品规格的生产者组织(PO)的质量选择。该模型假设,PO选择的质量水平,最大限度地提高联合生产者的利润,在预期的竞争均衡,一旦质量设置。使用一个相当普遍的变化的垂直分化模型和灵活的规格的生产成本,我们表明,PO有激励供应质量超过社会最优水平。牛津大学出版社.
This study investigates the choice of quality by producer organisations (POs) in charge of defining product specifications for geographical indications. The model assumes that the PO chooses the quality level that maximises joint producer profits in anticipation of the competitive equilibrium that arises once quality is set. Using a fairly general variant of the vertical differentiation model and a flexible specification of production costs, we show that the PO has an incentive to supply quality in excess of the socially optimal level. , Oxford University Press.