On the Approximation Resiliency of Logic Locking and IC Camouflaging Schemes
On the Approximation Resiliency of Logic Locking and IC Camouflaging Schemes
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DOI：
10.1109/tifs.2018.2850319
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发表时间：
2019-02
影响因子：
6.8
通讯作者：
Kaveh Shamsi;Travis Meade;M. Li;D. Pan;Yier Jin
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Kaveh Shamsi;Travis Meade;M. Li;D. Pan;Yier Jin
基于SAT的攻击是非常成功的去混淆传统的组合逻辑锁定和IC封装方案。虽然最近已经提出了几个SAT弹性保护计划，增加了最小查询计数的攻击，他们都不满足输出损坏（错误）的标准。因此，他们中的大多数都结合了高腐败的计划，以实现腐败和高查询计数。这些“复合”方案是成功的，因为现有的SAT攻击是不可知的保护方案的腐败。在本文中，我们提出了一个近似的SAT为基础的攻击框架，重点是迭代收敛的攻击走向一个更好的解决方案。这有助于我们的攻击将复合方案减少到独立的SAT弹性方案。此外，我们将最小查询计数的问题与一个著名的图问题，我们提出了一种新的技术，以可控的方式增加SAT弹性保护计划的腐败。这创建了具有高查询计数和可破坏性的保护方案。此外，由于这些方案的近似弹性属性，近似攻击在攻击它们时没有提供优于精确攻击的优势。
The SAT-based attacks are extremely successful in deobfuscating the traditional combinational logic locking and IC camouflaging schemes. While several SAT-resilient protection schemes that increase the minimum query count of the attack have been proposed recently, none of them satisfy the output corruptibility (error) criteria. Therefore, most of them were combined with high corruptibility schemes to achieve both corruptibility and high query count. These “compound” schemes are successful since existing SAT attacks are agnostic to the corruptibility of the protection scheme. In this paper, we propose an approximate SAT-based attack framework which focuses on the iterative convergence of an attack toward a better solution. This helps our attack reduce a compound scheme to a standalone SAT-resilient scheme. In addition, we relate the problem of minimum query count to a well-known graph problem, and we propose a novel technique to increase the corruptibility of SAT-resilient protection schemes in a controllable manner. This creates protection schemes that have both high query count and corruptibility. Furthermore, due to the approximation resiliency property of these schemes, approximate attacks provide no advantage over exact attacks when attacking them.