A model of producer incentives for livestock disease management
A model of producer incentives for livestock disease management
复制标题
牲畜疾病管理的生产者激励模型
DOI：
10.1007/s00477-005-0237-5
复制
发表时间：
2005
影响因子：
4.2
通讯作者：
R. Lubowski
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
R. Ranjan;R. Lubowski
我们从生产者的角度研究牲畜疾病的管理，将生产者和监管机构之间的信息和激励不对称。使用随机动态模型，我们研究了不同的政策选择，包括赔偿金，补贴报告的风险动物，监测和监管方法，以减少感染风险时，不正当的激励措施和多种政策相互作用的反应。这一概念分析说明了设计监管和激励政策有效组合的重要性。
We examine the management of livestock diseases from the producers‘ perspective, incorporating information and incentive asymmetries between producers and regulators. Using a stochastic dynamic model, we examine responses to different policy options including indemnity payments, subsidies to report at-risk animals, monitoring, and regulatory approaches to decreasing infection risks when perverse incentives and multiple policies interact. This conceptual analysis illustrates the importance of designing efficient combinations of regulatory and incentive-based policies.