The effects of heterogeneous confidence on cooperation in spatial prisoner's dilemma game
The effects of heterogeneous confidence on cooperation in spatial prisoner's dilemma game
复制标题
空间囚徒困境博弈中异质信心对合作的影响
DOI：
10.1209/0295-5075/132/48004
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发表时间：
2020-11-01
期刊：
影响因子：
1.8
通讯作者：
Yang, Junzhong
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
He, Guipeng;Zhang, Liming;Yang, Junzhong
信心是人们评价事物时的一种感觉，它会显著影响人们的选择或行为。Szolnoki和Chen（Phys. Rev. E，98（2018）022309）在进化博弈论的框架下发现，自信不足和过度自信的个体都能促进群体中的合作。在他们的研究中，假设过度自信和不足自信的个体都具有同质的置信水平，并且在整个进化过程中置信水平保持不变。作为一个直接的扩展，在这项工作中，我们把置信水平作为一个属性的个人，并分配给每个人的置信水平，这可能是静态的或随时间变化的。研究了异质信任度对进化博弈中合作的影响，并考虑了两种不同的情况。对于静态情况，我们假设个体的置信水平是从一定区间内的均匀分布中得出的。而在时变情形下，个体的信心水平与策略可以协同演化。通过数值模拟，我们发现当分布参数满足一定条件时，静态的异质置信度可以增强合作。基于对群体策略配置的观察，给出了一些分析性的解释。此外，当个体的信任水平被允许与他们的策略在进化动态过程中共同进化时，合作可以显着改善。我们还发现，存在一个最佳的增量的信心水平，导致最高的合作水平。
Confidence, which characterizes the feeling when people evaluate something, could influence their choices or behaviors significantly. Under the framework of evolutionary game theory, Szolnoki and Chen (Phys. Rev. E, 98 (2018) 022309) found that, both underconfident and overconfident individuals can promote cooperation in the population. In their work, underconfident and overconfident individuals are both assumed to have homogeneous confidence levels and the confidence levels remain unchanged during the whole evolutionary process. As a direct extension, in this work, we treat confidence level as an attribute of the individuals and assign each one a confidence level, which may be static or time-varied. The effects of heterogeneous confidence on cooperation in evolutionary games are investigated and two different cases are considered. For the static case, we assume that individuals' confidence levels are drawn from a uniform distribution in a certain interval. Whereas, for the time-varied case, the confidence levels of individuals can coevolve with the strategies. By numerical simulation, we find that the static heterogeneous confidence can enhance cooperation when the parameters of distribution satisfy certain conditions. Some analytic explanations based on the observations of strategy configurations among the population are provided. Furthermore, when individuals' confidence levels are allowed to coevolve with their strategies during the evolutionary dynamics, cooperation could be significantly improved. We also find that there exists an optimal increment for the confidence level which leads to the highest cooperation level.