Pure Strategy Nash Equilibrium in a Group Formation Game with Positive Externalities
Pure Strategy Nash Equilibrium in a Group Formation Game with Positive Externalities
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DOI：
10.1006/game.1997.0542
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发表时间：
1997-10
影响因子：
1.1
通讯作者：
Hideo Konishi;M. Breton;Shlomo Weber
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Hideo Konishi;M. Breton;Shlomo Weber
摘要本文给出了具有正外部性的无溢出非合作博弈的支付函数的一个定义域，该定义域存在一个纯策略纳什均衡。由于一般情况下纳什均衡可能不存在，为了保证均衡的存在，我们强加了两个额外的假设，即随机性和有序性。我们的主要结果的证明是通过对给定的博弈G构造一个在策略剖面集合上的势函数来实现的，使得势函数的最大值在G的纯策略中产生一个纳什均衡。经济学期刊文献分类号：C72、D62、H73。
Abstract This paper identifies a domain of payoff functions in no spillover noncooperative games with Positive externality which admit a pure strategy Nash equilibrium. Since in general a Nash equilibrium may fail to exist, in order to guarantee the existence of an equilibrium, we impose two additional assumptions, Anonymity and Order preservation . The proof of our main result is carried out by constructing, for a given game G , a potential function Ψ over the set of strategy profiles in such a way that the maximum of Ψ yields a Nash equilibrium in pure strategies of G . Journal of Economics Literature Classification Numbers: C72, D62, H73.